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LUNCHEON
THE ROLE OF MEDIATION IN AIRLINE LABOR DISPUTES*
By

HOWARD

G.

GAMSERt

T

HIS AFTERNOON we are going to close what has been a most extensive and intensive scrutiny of the operation and administration of the
Railway Labor Act. It has probably been the most thorough review undertaken since the Act was passed thirty-five years ago. As you can well
imagine, an agency with three members and a staff of twenty mediators
ranks well down in the governmental pecking order. We are not only
located well below the salt, but on most occasions we do not even get to
the table. The sponsors of this event should be congratulated for gambling
so successfully on the widespread interest manifested by this attendance in
such an esoteric and neglected subject.
Various standing and ad hoc committees of the American Bar Association have been assigned jurisdiction and do review our activities. Periodic
reports have been made to that body. We also find an occasional law review
article prompted by a court decision arising under the Act. Still less frequently, an article of more general application will appear in an industrial
relations journal. Except for discussions of emergency disputes procedures
under section 10, I think it would be fair to say two things: First, in recent years very little has been said or written about the Act and the work
of the Mediation Board by disinterested students of labor-management relations, especially when compared to the voluminous published material on
the other federal labor-management relations statute (Brand X) ; and
second, what little has been said or written has not always been favorable.
When an occasion such as this presents itself, one might be tempted to
raise his voice in defense of the Establishment. I do not intend to do that
this afternoon. Recent experience in the academic community has clearly
shown that to defend the Establishment is dangerous folly and not a constructive effort. In addition, that was not my assigned task at this meeting-nor is it my disposition. However, before proceeding with my assigned
topic, may I, on behalf of my colleagues, ask the judge to instruct the
jury regarding the silence of the accused and the severe inhibition on
inference which may be drawn therefrom.
There is an additional reason for not raising my lance at this time. Previous utterances and much of the material presented at this symposium
* These comments represent the personal views of the speaker and do not reflect the opinions of
the National Mediation Board or its other members.
t Formerly member of the National Mediation Board, Chairman 1965 and 1968. Presently Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and practicing attorney.
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focus on and emphasize the rules of law to be applied in the administration of the statute. It would seem to me that it might be at least as
profitable to pay some attention to the spirit and intent of the law and the
obligations which it imposes upon the parties to a dispute about wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment. Statutory amendments and
the promulgation of amended rules might very well be helpful, but of
transcending importance is the conduct and attitude of management and
the unions. The much more detailed and pervasive provisions of TaftHartley, as well as the National Labor Relations Board book of procedures
and rules, have not been a guarantor of good faith and harmony. A constructive climate of labor-management relations cannot be reached with
only the assistance of a road map provided by the government.
Before coming to this meeting, I had an opportunity to spend several
long nights trying to keep awake while the parties to a dispute were
closeted in their respective rooms reviewing their positions. (More than
likely they were merely killing time so that the other side would believe
that serious consideration was being given to proposals which had just a
little earlier been unalterably characterized as unrealistic, heinous, barbarous, ruinous or just plain stupid. Incidentally, these proposals so
characterized later formed the core of the settlement.) As you know, waiting time, or down time, is the major element in the mediator's job description. After my usual review of the local papers, the room service menu,
and the Gideon Bible in the telephone table drawer, the long night still
stretched ahead. I began to think about the title of the speech that I was
to give at this symposium-"The Role of Mediation in Airline Labor Disputes."
In order to get a grasp of the subject, I attempted a semantic dissection
of that title. Several different approaches were necessary. My first attempt
was to analyze the word "role" standing by itself. I assumed it meant
function or purpose or referred to the goal or objective of mediation. As
to that, the answer was obvious-the statute plainly states the goal or
role is, "to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions"--certainly there
was not enough there to fill a luncheon speech.
Perhaps the clue for my theme or the subject matter of my remarks
was to be found in the whole phrase, "role of mediation," calling for a
learned discourse on the subject of mediation as an art or a science.
As you know, there is a current controversy over the correct characterization of this craft. Is the role of mediation an "art" or a "science?" This
dispute has been of great interest to me. In order to sharpen my professional skills, as a practitioner with a government license, I have avidly
perused the literature which has been appearing on "non-violent conflict
resolution." I have read the works of some of the game theorists, the model
constructors and mathematical formulae others have adducted representing the dynamics of the bargaining table. In relating these writings to my
own experience, I have thoroughly enjoyed their imaginative descriptions
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of what is supposed to happen in the smoke-filled rooms where the agreement is ostensibly being hammered out. I have certainly envied their ability
to use computers to simulate responses and their discoveries of "signals"
in bargaining.
Following this approach, during the course of that long night, somewhere close to dawn I evolved a master theory of my own called "Conflict
Resolution Attitudinal Processes." After a few hours of sleep and a closer
examination of this theory's short hand designation-C.R.A.P.-I abandoned that exercise and any thought of lecturing at length on that subject
at this meeting.
In any event, my present predilection leans toward that school which
declares that mediation is an "art" and not a "science" at all. This "art,"
as I now view it after many years of practice, seems to resemble a Jackson
Pollack more than it does a Rembrandt, and thus, defies description. You
must really experience abstract art, not just view it.
Now that I had discarded the idea of talking about the role itself or the
role of mediation, there I was with only the "airline industry" portion of
my speech title left from which to launch this address.
Well, perhaps, it was not yet time to despair. Perhaps, airline mediation
problems were different, unique or might one say, peculiar? I went to an
old experienced management man in the airline industry and asked him
how I might distinguish the airline industry and its problems from those
of other industries. "Tell them how much we pay those glorified truckdrivers," he said, "$75,000 next year to fly the 747 for about 53 hours a
month. Tell them about the $300,000 we have tied up in training one of
those bus jockeys." As I left his office, I spent a few minutes chatting with
his secretary. (I always do this when I pay him a visit because she reminds
me of an outstanding woman who I respect and admire-Gina Lollobrigida.) "Tell them," she said, after I related my conversation with her
boss and asked for her opinion about the uniqueness of the airline industry,
"that this is the only industry that pays off with a once a year free flight
instead of cash. I could make $50 a week more working down the street
for those lawyers. As for training, I had to pay my own way through
secretarial school before he would take me off the reception desk. Now
that we have a Pacific Route, he has demanded that I go to night school
and learn Tagalog on my own time or back I go to the reception desk."
Another industry spokesman, to whom I made the same request, wanted
me to be sure and mention the amount of regulation to which the industry
is subjected. "You tell them that the government tells us where we can
fly, when we can fly, how much we can charge and what's a fair return
on our investment. We just can't jack up our prices at will every time
we are blackjacked into making an exorbitant settlement." However, working with the railroad industry and having previous experience with motor
freight, maritime operators and utilities, I knew that the airlines did not
stand alone at all when it came to government regulation and control.
Now there is no doubt that the airline industry is more glamorous than
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most any others you might mention. There is romance and beauty in the
wild blue yonder. Mary Wells has made sure that we know all about that,
and most airlines "flaunt it." Unfortunately, the glamor and the romance
do not seem particularly relevant when we talk about wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment, such as the degree of consaguinity to the deceased necessary to qualify for funeral leave with pay.
The glamour does not seem to have any more impact or importance in
dispute settlement in this industry than the lack of same might have in
the fertilizer industry.
At this point in my analysis of the subject, with the "role" out, the
"role of mediation" out, and the "airline industry" just about out, I was
about to conclude that I was stuck with a lousy title! Then, sitting in my
office at the National Mediation Board, I had a brilliant intuitive flash.
Except for the railroad industry, the airlines are the only group to bargain
under the aegis of the Railway Labor Act! Could any distinctions be
found there?
Unlike the rest of industry, our labor agreements are, by statute, not
written for a fixed term. They are only amendable through the process of
serving a notice of intent to seek a change in specific existing conditions,
and time limits or moratoriums on filing such notice do not appear in the
law. Although this distinction has some validity in the railroad industry,
and perhaps an affect on the institution of collective bargaining, in fact,
the airlines and their unions have acted as if their agreements were for a
fixed term. This was no help.
Another possible distinguishing characteristic impinging upon the bargaining process under the statute was that, by court decision, it has been
determined that a union may not strike over "minor disputes," or grievances arising over the interpretation or application of agreements. Yet in
the vast majority of collective agreements not under our jurisdiction, contractual provisions dealing with the disposition of grievances and resort to
arbitration have virtually eliminated the need for mediators' skills in peace-fully settling this type of issue. Again, perhaps this was a distinction, but
it was only a blurred one with minimal impact upon the bargaining process
in the airline industry.
There is still another distinguishing characteristic of bargaining under
the Railway Labor Act, and this one may be of some greater significance.
Only under this statute must there be a finding by a government agency
that the best efforts to bring about an amicable settlement through mediation have been unsuccessful. Then and only then, after a required proffer
and declination of arbitration by either party, and an additional waiting
period, may the parties resort to the exertion of economic pressure. Only
in the airline and railroad industries must a government agency determine
when the green light will flash and when movement toward the moment
of truth will occur, even in cases not of national importance.
This special power which the Board possesses has been the subject of
some recent comment from both labor and management in the airline in-
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dustry. One labor organization has publicly taken the position that the
Board is prone to abuse this power, to hold on to cases in mediation, and
is a poor judge of when its best efforts in mediation have failed. This
organization has contended that the proffer of arbitration, which sets the
clock running, is a ministerial act and the proffer must be made upon the
request of either party in mediation. I believe the union has further suggested that if the Board should fail to heed such a request within a reasonable time, a mandamus action would be appropriate.
Some airline spokesmen have another view of these unique powers given
to the Board under the statute. They hold that the Board can, by greater
exercise of discretion than heretofore employed, achieve more meaningful
direct negotiations and effective mediation. They argue that the parties
". .. shall exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements. . . ." That duty is imposed on the parties by the language of the
statute, and the National Mediation Board should carefully examine the
conduct of the parties, in direct negotiations, to see that they have fulfilled their statutory duty before the Board dockets the case for mediation,
and thus possibly gets it on the track toward eventual resort to self-help.
These spokesmen further suggest that, after a case has been in mediation,
the Board once again exercises its discretion-which they allege exists under
the statute-by not releasing jurisdiction, and start the 30 day period
running with a proffer of arbitration, if either party has not, in the opinion
of the Board, "made every effort to resolve the dispute. ..."
In usual mediator fashion, I find merit in both the contentions of the
union and the proposals of the carrier spokesmen. However, both sets of
proposals raise some questions. Does the union's contention that the mediator should get in and out of a case purely at the will of either party fail
to recognize the requirement of the statute that they shall make every
reasonable effort to peacefully resolve disputes? More importantly, does this
union contention overlook the public interest and stake in disputes in the
transportation industry and the whole thrust of the law which emphasizes
this and the Mediation Board's responsibility for the peaceful resolution of
such disputes? As to the carriers' proposals, before taking jurisdiction and
assigning a mediator to the case, how is the Board to determine whether a
good faith effort was made by either or both sides in direct negotiations?
Basically, is there statutory language to allow the Board to make such a
determination when the statute also says the parties or either party may
invoke the services of the Board? That question aside, in what way does
the Board gain the knowledge necessary to make a determination that both
or either party has not exerted every reasonable effort in direct negotiations? Will a unilateral contention of one of the parties suffice? Shall the
Board demand affidavits, investigate or conduct a hearing? In any event,
how does such a proceeding or action insure good faith and best efforts in
further direct negotiations? Basically, will such governance by the Board
realistically assist in furthering a peaceful resolution of the issues?
Once a case is in active mediation, the Board receives periodic confi-
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dential reports from its mediators. These reports on the progress of the case
might, in certain instances, provide some intelligence about the efforts each
of the parties is making at the bargaining table. Even with such information at hand, what criteria shall the Board employ in making a determination that one side or the other deserves to be held in status quo? I need
not dwell upon the difficulties inherent in making determinations about
good faith bargaining. We are all too familiar with the legal history of
enforcement of this requirement under the other statute.
A few comments concerning both sets of proposals-those from the
union and those from some carrier representatives-may be in order here.
Does this union proposal reflect a more widespread opinion among unions
dealing with the airlines that in this industry realistic bargaining only takes
place under the gun? Are they saying that there is more foot dragging and
procrastination possible in bargaining under the labyrinthic procedures of
the Railway Labor Act? Are they saying that such tactics are more prevalent in this industry than elsewhere? Do the carrier proposals suggest that
some of their representatives are uncomfortable bargaining in the face of
possible immediate economic pressure, although all industries not under
this statute do so almost all of the time? Do the industry proposals indicate
that in someone's opinion there is a qualitative difference existing between
bargaining directly, bargaining in mediation and bargaining during the
period immediately before the parties can resort to self-help?
Fundamentally, are both these sets of proposals symptomatic of a more
deep seated malaise that requires something more in the way of corrective
action than a government agency's lighter or heavier foot on the speed
controls? Personally, as a Member of the Board, and again speaking only
for myself, such proposals raise additional disturbing questions regarding
our administration of the law as it is now written. Can we act in a purely
ministerial fashion on the one hand, when the statute mandates that we use
our best efforts to bring the parties to agreement? Can we be called upon
to make judgments concerning the good faith of the parties, on the other
hand, when our major task is conflict resolution and our only tool to
accomplish this is peaceful persuasion? Will the adoption of either suggested course jeopardize the fiduciary and confidential relationship with
the parties which mediators and their agency must have in order to be
effective? Whether you regard mediation as an art or a science, there should
be general agreement about one thing. The mediator is to be neither a
judge nor an evaluator; he is neither a fact finder nor an arbitrator. It
may be fatal in some instances to confuse these roles. If you require that
he wear one of these other hats and also try to mediate, will you destroy
his usefulness and acceptability as a mediator? I think the mediator has
a creative role to play in the bargaining process, but are these parties indicating by these proposals that they are only looking for a traffic cop?
In concluding, may I just call your attention again to the fact that I
have adopted some old mediator's tricks of the trade in this address. These
proposals advanced by each side have been duly transmitted. I have an-
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swered most questions with another question. Personal judgments, evaluations and characterizations of these ideas have been avoided. Nor have you
heard any mediator's proposals. It does not appear that the parties are
quite ready for these to be laid on the table. The time may come when
the mediator's proposal is a constructive act in conflict resolution. When
and if appropriate, my views will be put forward. You see, we always
stand ready, in true mediatot fashion, to help the parties help themselves.

